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Analysing the Second Karabakh War

On 27 September 2020, an entrenched dynamic of escalation culminated in an all-out war between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the contested territory of Nagorny Karabakh. As many as 7,000 were killed in action on all sides. More than 170 civilians, a majority of them Azerbaijanis, were also killed. Some 130,000 were displaced from their homes, the majority of them Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh. On 9 November, a Russian-brokered ceasefire declaration was signed, mandating the deployment of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region. Through a series of interviews and articles, our South Caucasus Programme Director, Laurence Broers, analysed the developing conflict, the humanitarian crisis, the ceasefire declaration and what’s next for relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

February 2021

Image: A soldier back from the frontlines around Shusha (known as Shushi to Armenians) returns to his house to pack up and leave the region of Kelbajar, prior to its transfer back to Azerbaijani jurisdiction after the war. Credit: Jack Losh.

Contextualising the new violence in a long-standing dispute: october 2020.

Laurence Broers joined Nina Caspersen and Thomas de Waal to discuss whether events in Nagorny Karabakh represented a shift from the previous political and strategic trendlines, and possible future trajectories. 

Humanitarian crisis in and around Nagorny Karabakh: October 2020

This article for Chatham House focuses on the humanitarian catastrophe which unfolded in and around Nagorny Karabakh, aggravated by COVID-19 and the onset of winter. 

Russia’s peace imposed on Armenia-Azerbaijan bloodshed: November 2020

In November 2020, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a trilateral declaration to end the war in Nagorny Karabakh. But in this article for Chatham House, Laurence Broers argues that the  declaration fails to resolve the issues at the core of the conflict. 

Is Karabakh Going to Become like Abkhazia & South Ossetia? November 2020

Laurence Broers joins CivilNet to give his take on resolving the issue of the status of Nagorny Karabakh, as well as Russia securing its interests, the challenges facing Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the possibility of Nagorny Karabakh developing along the lines of South Ossetia. 

The EU and Karabakh: Picking up the pieces, looking for a role: January 2021

Confronted with a major conflict in the body’s “Eastern Partnership” zone, the EU was able to do little during the Second Karabakh War other than issue statements of concern. But the EU could now contribute to making the emerging regional order more viable – and rebuilding trust with the parties.

Read Laurence Broers' article for Eurasianet. 

Seeing beyond victory and defeat: pathways for Armenian-Azerbaijani relations after the second Karabakh war

The recent war has created a new and challenging landscape for any transformation of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. These two articles explore the possible pathways confronting Armenia and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of war and their implications for long-term peace. 

Read Laurence Broers' articles for Baku Dialogues  and Analyticon . 

Perspectives | The OSCE’s Minsk Group: A unipolar artifact in a multipolar world - May 2021

For 26 years, the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) worked fruitlessly to bring the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to a peaceful resolution. Then, in just six weeks, the Second Karabakh War radically altered the conflict and the Minsk Group was shunted aside. In this article for Eurasianet , Laurence Broers explores the reasons why diplomacy became so irrelevant to resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

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The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense

Photo: ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images

Critical Questions by Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh

Published December 8, 2020

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region included the heavy use of missiles, drones, and rocket artillery. The fighting, which began in late September, concluded on November 10 through a Moscow-brokered truce that resulted in the deployment of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers and significant Armenian territorial concessions. Azerbaijan was the clear military victor, with both Russia and Turkey also benefiting politically from the war’s outcome.

The 44-day war featured a diverse array of legacy and advanced air and missile strike and defense platforms. The ballistic missiles used spanned generations, from older Soviet-era Scud and Tochka missiles to the newer and more advanced Iskander and the Israeli-made LORA (LOng Range Attack) missiles. Drones of Russian, Turkish, Israeli, and indigenous designs performed both reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition attacks were able to destroy heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defenses. The conflict’s use of these various weapons provides important information and insights into how modern wars will employ the growing spectrum of missiles, drones, and artillery.

Q1: What missiles, drones, and rockets do Armenia and Azerbaijan have?

A1 : Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have invested in modernizing their militaries, including fielding more advanced air and missile systems. Azerbaijan is considered to have the more diverse and qualitatively superior military.

Armenia’s missile arsenal is comprised entirely of Russian rockets. Armenia inherited its Tochka and Scud missiles from the Soviet Union following its collapse and purchased Iskander missiles from Russia in 2016. Armenia’s rocket artillery is also mostly Russian, apart from its Chinese WM-80 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). Armenia’s drone fleet consists of smaller indigenous systems focused on reconnaissance missions. They are generally recognized as less capable than Azerbaijan’s fleet of foreign UAVs.

Table 1: Armenia’s Missiles, Drones, and Rocket Artillery

By contrast, Azerbaijan fields a more diverse and modern arsenal of missiles, rockets, and drones. The country’s oil and gas sales over the past two decades have enabled it to modernize its armed forces, including significant funding for missiles, drones, and rocket artillery. In addition to the Tochka missiles it inherited from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan purchased the Israeli LORA ballistic missile and EXTRA (EXTended Range Artillery) guided rocket. Both are more accurate than the older Soviet missiles.

Azerbaijan also developed an impressive drone arsenal composed of Turkish and Israeli UAVs. It acquired the Turkish TB2 earlier this year, with reports suggesting the sale occurred as recently as June 2020. Previously, Azerbaijan had purchased numerous Israeli loitering munitions, also known as “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones, including the Harop, Orbiter, and SkyStriker UAVs. In the recent conflict, Azerbaijan also reportedly modified its Soviet-era An-2 Colt biplanes with remote-control systems, flying them to the front lines to draw out Armenian air defenses.

Azerbaijan likewise invested heavily in rocket artillery. The Turkish TRG-300 and Belarusian Polonez MLRS systems stand out with their ability to range targets up to 120 and 200 km away, respectively. As with Armenia, however, the BM-30 Smerch appeared to be Azerbaijan’s rocket of choice.

Table 2: Azerbaijan’s Missiles, Drones, and Rocket Artillery

Q2: Why didn’t Armenia or Azerbaijan use more longer-range missiles?

A2 : Despite early concerns that fighting could escalate to the targeting of strategic infrastructure and civilian territories, both Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to have limited their use of larger, longer-range missiles. Instead, only a few events during the conflict involved ballistic missile attacks. In at least one event, Armenia reportedly used Tochka and Scud missiles in attacks on Ganja, the second-most populous city in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan used a LORA short-range ballistic missile in a more tactical role on October 2 to target a bridge connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

One potential explanation for this limited use is the small missile inventories possessed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. In contrast to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have relied on a steady stream of Iranian support to maintain a long ballistic missile war against Saudi Arabia, both Azerbaijan and Armenia seemed to want to conserve their limited munition stockpiles at the outset of hostilities. Both countries inherited small inventories of ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union, and each has supplemented that arsenal with more modern missiles. Armenia purchased Iskander missiles from Russia, and Azerbaijan bought the LORA from Israel. None of these sales included substantial quantities of missiles required for extended missile warfare. Despite early Armenian threats to use its more advanced Iskander missiles, the attacks on Ganja used older Soviet weapons. It was only on November 9—right before the peace agreement was signed—that footage emerged of an Armenian Iskander launch. It seems that these small arsenals forced each side to use ballistic missiles sparingly to preserve inventory if the conflict lasted longer.

A desire to contain the conflict could explain the hesitancy to use longer-range ballistic missiles. Both sides may have determined that attacks on cities or vital infrastructure may invite escalation beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Furthermore, Armenia and Azerbaijan could already hit most targets in the region with long-range rocket artillery, thus limiting the value of using more expensive and limited ballistic missiles. Armenian ballistic missile strikes in Ganja, which is outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, would seem to be an outlier in this regard, though.

Azerbaijan’s use of the LORA illustrates some of the limits of ballistic missiles as a tool for military operations. Baku specifically used the LORA to strike a bridge connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh in an attempt to cut off Armenian reinforcements and supplies. According to imagery after the strike, the attack failed to incapacitate the bridge, suggesting limits even to the most precise ballistic missiles. Given this apparent failure to achieve the mission with a ballistic missile, its limited arsenal, and the alternative of cheaper rockets and drones, it is unsurprising that Azerbaijan opted to limit its use of ballistic missiles throughout the conflict.

Q3: Why did drone warfare receive so much attention?

A3 : Azerbaijani drones were the center of attention in this war. Although Armenia deployed some of their own indigenously produced drones, and later footage showed their side using the more sophisticated Russian-made Orlan-10 UAV, it was Azerbaijan who took control of the skies.

As numerous   recent   reports have argued, these weapons were game-changing. Azerbaijani drones provided significant advantages in ISR as well as long-range strike capabilities. They enabled Azerbaijani forces to find, fix, track, and kill targets with precise strikes far beyond the front lines. UAVs were operationally integrated with fires from manned aircraft and land-based artillery but also frequently used their own ordinance to destroy various high-value military assets. Open-source reporting suggests that drones contributed to disabling a huge number of Armenian tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery units, and air defenses. Their penetration of Nagorno-Karabakh’s deep rear also weakened Armenian supply lines and logistics, facilitating later Azerbaijani success in battle.

The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 in particular demonstrated the versatility of UAV platforms. Turkey previously used these drones to great effect in Syria and Libya . In Nagorno-Karabakh, the TB2 likewise performed well in targeting and destroying enemy defenses. In addition to providing identification and targeting data, the TB2s also carried smart, micro guided munitions to kill targets on their own. Azerbaijan has also used the high-definition cameras the TB2s carry to produce many propaganda videos. Videos showcasing attacks on Armenian fighters and equipment were posted online and broadcast on digital billboards in Baku.

Yet while drones played a large role in this conflict, their capabilities ought not be exaggerated. These platforms are very vulnerable to air defenses that are designed to counter them—defenses Armenia did not have in adequate numbers. The bulk of Armenia’s air defenses consisted of obsolete Soviet-era systems, like the 2K11 Krug, 9K33 Osa, 2K12 Kub, and 9K35 Strela-10. TB2s flew too high for these systems to intercept even if they were able to detect these relatively small aircraft. Russian-supplied Polye-21 electronic warfare systems disrupted Azerbaijani drone operations but only for four days. Armenia’s Buk and Tor-M2KM air defenses likely downed a few drones, but they were deployed late in the conflict, limited in number, and vulnerable to attack themselves. Armenia’s larger air defenses like the S-300 are not designed for counter-UAV missions and were targeted early in the conflict by Azerbaijani loitering munitions. According to Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijani forces destroyed seven S-300 transporter erector launchers, two guidance stations, and one radar. These strikes further illustrate the vulnerability of advanced air defense systems, even if these numbers are exaggerated or the systems were not completely destroyed.

Q4: What broader lessons can we learn from the air war?

A4 : The primary lesson from the air war over Nagorno-Karabakh is the importance of full-spectrum air defense. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s short-range air defense (SHORAD) arsenals were limited in size and quality. Azerbaijan was able to exploit this gap with its large fleet of sophisticated drones.

Major powers like the United States, China, and Russia are in the process of developing and deploying their own drone countermeasures, including kinetic interceptors, electronic jammers, and even counter-drone drones. While these technologies exist today, there are difficulties in developing them at an affordable rate to provide defense at multiple echelons, including the tactical level. Armor and other heavy ground units will likely remain vulnerable until mobile SHORAD systems improve and proliferate.

The conflict also provides yet another reminder about the importance of passive defense. In an age of highly proliferated sensors and shooters, militaries will need to consider new ways to camouflage and harden their forces. Ground force tactics on dispersal and deception ought to be reinvigorated. Soldiers should train to limit their electronic and thermal signatures for longer distances and times. The video and imagery available online suggest that neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani forces had adequate resources or training on passive defense. We see this time   and   time again with both sides operating out in the open, static or moving slowly; poorly camouflaged; and clumped in tight, massed formations.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also illustrates that while individual weapons systems will not revolutionize the nature of warfare, the synchronization of new weapons makes the modern battlefield more lethal. Azerbaijan’s combination of drones and artillery effectively targeted Armenia’s high-value military assets, most notably in attacks on T-72 tanks and S-300 air defenses. In particular, strikes on air defense units constrained Armenia’s ability to counter Baku’s UAVs, amplifying their effectiveness. The use of UAVs and missiles to suppress and destroy air defenses gives greater validation to an observation of the U.S. Army’s Air and Missile Defense 2028  strategy : “The most stressing threat is a complex, integrated attack incorporating multiple threat capabilities in a well-coordinated and synchronized attack.”

The lessons here are not new. The importance of both full-spectrum air defense and passive defenses have been shown in battles across   the   Middle East and in planning for potential conflict with Russia and China . The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides a small but important case study in the character of modern air and missile warfare.

Shaan Shaikh is a research associate with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Wes Rumbaugh is an associate fellow with the CSIS Missile Defense Project.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Shaan Shaikh

Wes Rumbaugh

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Implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Turkish-Russian Relations and Shifting Geopolitics in the Greater Middle East

By Samuel Levy  /  Jan. 27, 2021, 10:51 a.m.

On December 1, 2020, Azerbaijan took control of the last of the districts that Armenia agreed to hand over to Azerbaijan after signing a ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. With it, a new geopolitical reality has emerged in the South Caucasus, with implications for the greater region and Turkish-Russian relations.

In September, war broke out between neighboring Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven Armenian-controlled districts surrounding it. At its core, the war between these two former Soviet constituent republics of the Caucasus region was a nationalistic border dispute, with the more powerful Turkey and Russia highly invested in the outcome.

After weeks of heavy fighting, allegations of human rights violations on both sides, and global popular support campaigns that reached even the UChicago campus , Azerbaijan defeated Armenia. On November 9, shortly after Azerbaijan conquered the strategic city of Susha, or Shushi, the president of Armenia announced on Facebook that he made the "hard, hard decision" to agree to a Russian-mediated ceasefire agreement . Per the agreement, Armenia agreed to cede the seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh from the war, while Russia has stationed peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh to prevent further conflict. 

The ceasefire has mostly held, though Russia reported a ceasefire violation on December 11, with Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing each other of instigating the violation. On January 11, the leaders of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan held a meeting in Moscow, announcing the creation of a trilateral working group for “unblocking all economic and transport links in the region.”

With the ceasefire agreement, a new geopolitical reality has emerged between Turkey, Russia, and  Western powers and their influence in the South Caucasus, with critical implications for the power dynamics of the Middle East. Before the war, Russia held the strongest influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, though its hold over Armenia appeared to be slipping, and the OSCE Minsk Group chaired by France, the United States, and Russia was the main peacemaking and conflict negotiation body for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After the war, Russia has reasserted its influence in the South Caucasus while the US and French influences have diminished. Meanwhile, Turkey has emerged as a more prominent source of influence.

Implementation of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement as of December 8, 2020. 

Russia's Role

Russia is the preeminent source of influence in the South Caucasus, formerly part of the Soviet Union’s domain , and its role in brokering the successful Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire will likely sustain its position and solidify its influence over Armenia. 

Russia was one of Azerbaijan's two biggest arms suppliers in 2018 and 2019 . While also supplying arms to Armenia, it has tried to balance relations between both sides and maintain broad influence in the South Caucasus.

Since 1992, Russian border guards have been stationed on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran to help Armenia defend itself, along with a Russian military base. A Turkish or Iranian invasion that would result in the deaths of Russia border guards in Armenia could be seen as an act of war against Russia as well. 

With the 2018 " velvet revolution ," a successful popular uprising against the Armenian governing establishment led by current Armenian president, then a member of parliament, Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia was on a long path of inching towards the West, slowly distancing itself from Russia in the process. Russia failed to send military forces into Nagorno-Karabakh to defend Armenia's position this year, despite Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) , Russia's rough equivalent to NATO. This may have signaled Russia’s dissatisfaction with Armenia's lean towards the West.

While Russia did not use troops in the war, it reportedly set up a small military outpost within Armenia-proper on Armenia’s border near Nagorno-Karabakh. This outpost acted as a tripwire to deter an Azerbaijani invasion into its core territory, though not one into Nagorno-Karabakh or the non-annexed Armenian-controlled territories it captured after the 1992-1994 war , where Armenia backs a separate, limitedly recognized Republic of Artsakh . 

However, with November’s ceasefire agreement, Russia has re-asserted itself as the principal protector of Armenia and increased its influence over the country. Russia has now stationed peacekeepers in both the Armenian and Azerbaijani-held areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, deterring further Azerbaijani attacks and securing a land route from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, now surrounded by Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh now joins the company of the limitedly recognized small republics that largely owe their existence to Russia forces stationed in their territories, such as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As Thomas de Waal, a scholar on Eurasian affairs and a senior fellow of Carnegie Europe notes , the recent agreement is similar to the so-called "Lavrov plan" that Russia has reportedly pushed for in the past three years. The plan , named after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov , would have reportedly forced Armenia to concede the seven districts surrounding the former Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region in exchange for Azerbaijan recognizing Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, and would have deployed Russian peacekeepers. 

Armenia seems to have caved into an agreement similar to Lavrov plan, with terms favorable to Azerbaijan since Armenia has now ceded a substantial amount of territory. But this increased reliance on Russia may come at a cost: its ability to self-determine its foreign policy. By accepting the offer of protection Russia has extended, Armenia will be more squarely within Russia’s sphere of influence , while Turkey’s role is expanding with regard to Azerbaijan.

Geopolitical map of the Caucasus before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Turkey's Expanded Role in the South Caucasus

Despite Russia’s tightened grip on Armenia, it is no longer the only major geopolitical player in the South Caucasus; Turkey has entered the fray. Turkey backed Azerbaijan in the war, continuing a tradition of solidarity with other Turkic nations and a long history of hostile relations with Armenia. Turkey was Azerbaijan's third-largest weapons supplier in 2019, after Israel and Russia, supplying Azerbaijan with cutting-edge drones , although Turkish arms transfers accounted for only 3.2 percent of Azerbaijan’s arms imports. Turkey reportedly also sent Syrian mercenaries and Turkish military personnel in the battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, though Turkey denies this. 

With Azerbaijan's apparent victory, Turkey has made moves to secure its influence. Turkish troops participated in an Azerbaijani military parade in Baku celebrating its victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey plans to deploy troops alongside Russian ones to establish a joint observation center in Nagorno-Karabakh, though the Russian foreign minister has said the Turkish peacekeepers will be limited Azerbaijani territory.

The end of the conflict has also removed a threat to important oil and gas pipelines for Turkey and Azerbaijan that run near Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and then Turkey. They also serve as an alternative to Russian pipelines to Europe. 

Notably, the agreement will further deepen Turkey’s access to Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkic countries via a new transport corridor between Azerbaijan's main territory and its exclave of Nakhchivan. The corridor will pass through Armenian territory but be guarded by the Russia border guards.

Iran’s Diminished Influence

Iran, a regional power directly south of Armenia and Azerbaijan, was largely sidelined by the ceasefire. Despite its large ethnic Azeri population , Iran has not taken an active role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, nor taken a clear position, trying to balance its ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The new transport corridor to Nakhchivan could decrease Iran’s influence. Iran previously served as the main land link between Nakhchivan and Armenia, charging a 15 percent commission on gas transported from the main part of Azerbaijan through Iran to Nakhchivan. With the new transport corridor, Turkish trade to Central Asia could more easily bypass Iran.

The South Caucasus Turns Away from the West

While Turkey expands its role in the South Caucasus, the West's role—via both individual nations and joint bodies like the OSCE Minsk Group—has waned . Despite their disputes, Turkey and Russia have agreed to form a new joint monitoring center in Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving out the OSCE Minsk Group chaired by the United States, Russia, and France, which had previously been the main observatory and peace mediation body.

Throughout the conflict, the Minsk Group and the Western powers leading it had little effect on the dispute, though not for lack of trying. A ceasefire agreement that resulted from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo bringing the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Washington, DC quickly fell through . With peacekeepers in Armenian-held Nagorno-Karabakh being exclusively Russian, and the Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan-held Nagorno-Karabakh poised to be joined by Turkish ones, the ceasefire agreement leaves far less room for Western powers to maneuver in the region. 

Nagorno-Karabakh in Context

The case of Nagorno-Karabakh is only part of larger trends in the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Russia and Turkey are among the main powers driving these trends. Both have participated in proxy conflicts and set their sights on expanding their respective spheres of influence in the greater Middle East, particularly in Libya and Syria.

In Libya, a 2011 NATO-led military intervention that helped overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi left years of civil war and a power vacuum in its wake. Both Russia and Turkey moved to fill the void and backed two opposing governments. Russia supports the Tobruk-based government and the Libyan National Army led by General Khalifa Haftar in the east, while Turkey supports the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west. Like in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey's ally had the upper hand. Russia deployed mercenaries in September 2019 to support Haftar’s offensive on GNA-held Tripoli, but a Turkish military intervention in January of 2020 helped rebuff Haftar's offensive. But unlike in Nagorno-Karabakh, other regional powers and international institutions wield their own influence, with the United Nations mediating the recent permanent ceasefire agreement in October between the opposing sides.

Following the United States’ near-total withdrawal from Syria in fall 2019 , Turkey and Russia alongside Iran have become leading power players in the Syrian civil war. Turkey, Russia, and their proxies and allies now divide much of Syria's territory . Turkey, Russia, and Iran have held formal diplomatic meetings since January of 2017, negotiating the terms to end the Syria conflict, and creating key joint statements . In February of 2020, 34 Turkish troops died in an airstrike in Syria that the US accused Russia of orchestrating. Not letting the airstrike thwart their cooperation in Syria, Turkey and Russia have implemented a ceasefire deal in the Idlib province since March of 2020, although this deal has often been violated .

Making Sense of the Turkish-Russian Relationship

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Turkish-Russian proxy conflict exemplify that the Turkish-Russian relationship does not fit neatly into simple categories of diplomatic relations. Despite being engaged in various proxy wars, both countries' leaders have continued to hash out agreements .

Relations did hit a period of overt tension from 2015-2017. In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian military jet; Russia returned with harsh sanctions in kind. However, the countries have since begun a rapprochement , lifting the sanctions. In 2019, Turkey purchased a S-400 missile defense system from Russia, much to the chagrin of US leaders. On December 14, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey for it. However, Turkey announced in October that it is expanding military cooperation with Russia's enemy, Ukraine. 

The bottom line: Russia and Turkey’s relationship is elusive, and viewing the two nations strictly in terms of friendship or enmity is to overlook the complex and unpredictable nature of their dynamic. 

Turkey and Russia share a distrust of Western-led multilateral institutions. While Turkey is a NATO member, it has strained relations with the other allies. Turkey and Russia also both maintain foreign policy strategies with a significant element of opportunism. They have embraced proxy warfare and have shied away from overt hostility and rivalry, despite their competing interests. They have sought to fill power vacuums in the greater Middle East, and they have both clashed and cooperated as a result of it. But Turkey may be outplaying Russia. 

The Future of the Greater Middle East

While both President-elect Joe Biden and the Trump administration have warned about the threat Russia poses as a potential rising great power on the global scale, Russia is arguably losing influence to Turkey, at least in the greater Middle East. Turkey has gained ground against Russian-backed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Russia's military expenditure is now comparable to Saudi Arabia's and one-tenth of the United States'. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and no longer has the same influence. 

As one writer for The Moscow Times puts it, perhaps the Nagorno-Karabakh agreement is a sign of Russia's imperial faltering, where its hegemony in the former Soviet Sphere is seemingly in decline. Russia has conceded to Turkey's expanded role in the former Soviet domain; it has faced NATO and European Union enlargement ; and it has watched China increase its influence in Central Asia . As the United States sounds the alarm of Russia’s ascendancy, whether Russia is truly growing as a great power remains up for debate.

The Turkish-Russian relationship does not fit into simple definitions of allies or adversaries, but will likely continue to have a substantial impact on affairs in the region as both powers vie to expand their influence. The ceasefires in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Idlib, are tenuous and not permanent peace agreements. Tied together by the Turkish-Russia relationship and their shared region, events in one conflict will likely affect the others, and could possibly create new fronts.

  All images featured in this article are in the public domain. The headline image was taken by Jonathan Alpeyrie and is licensed for reuse under Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 Licence . The featured map of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement was created by Emreculha and is licensed for reuse under the  Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International License . The Geopolitical Map of the Caucasus Region was created by Jeroencommons and is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license . No changes were made to the original images. 

Samuel Levy

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THE 2020 AUTUMN WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: COURSE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION

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The article aims to analyze the autumn war in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which took place in 2020, and explain its impact on the strategic balance of power in the South Caucasus region. This issue is important for regional security and power projection in the South Caucasus. The author focused on 1) The characteristics of the course of the war; 2) The impact of the war on the politics of Armenia and Azerbaijan; 3) The impact of the war on the new division of the sphere of influence between Russia and Turkey. In the course of the research, research techniques and methods characteristic of political science and security science (neoclassical realism paradigm) were used, including critical analysis of the literature on the subject, analysis of policy makers' statements, secondary analysis, and interpretation of quantitative data.

• armed conflict
• international relations
• balance of power
• Azerbaijian
• Nagorno-Karabakh
• European Union

Additional information

Notes on contributors, agnieszka miarka.

Agnieszka Miarka is attached to the Institute of Political Science at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. Email: [email protected]

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• KARABAKH - AZERBAIJAN

Patriotic War

The second karabakh war, patriotic war 27-12-2020.

Patriotic War or “Operation Iron Fist”

On the morning of 27 September 2020, Armenia’s Armed Forces launched a large-scale attack, subjecting settlements and frontline positions of the Azerbaijani army to intensive fire from large-calibre weapons, mortars and artillery devices of various calibre, following which, in order to halt the Armenian army’s attack and ensure the security of the civilian population, the Azerbaijani army command decided to launch a rapid counter-offensive along the whole front. As a result of these clashes, martial law and a general mobilization were declared in Armenia. In Azerbaijan, martial law and a curfew were declared, with a partial mobilization being declared on 28 September. The clashes escalated rapidly into the Second Karabakh War.

Many countries and also the United Nations called for a cessation of hostilities, for both sides to reduce tensions and resume talks without delay. Afghanistan, Ukraine, Pakistan, Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus expressed support for Azerbaijan. On 29 September, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although a humanitarian ceasefire, supported by Russia and mediated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was accepted by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, with official effect from 10 October, terrorist violations by Armenia’s Armed Forces that targeted civilians led to the suspension of wounded and prisoner exchange.

The background

Especially following the 1994 Bishkek Protocol signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan, which lost 20 percent of its territory as a result of the First Karabakh War, held long-term diplomatic talks with various international organizations. The purpose was to implement UN Security Council resolutions that demanded the unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from Azerbaijani territory. The peace process was severely shaken by populist statements such as "Karabakh is Armenia, full stop", by Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in Armenia after the colour revolution of 2018, as well as a succession of provocative and illegal visits to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and other actions.

In a continuation of those provocations, in March 2019, while on an official visit to the United States, Armenia’s Minister of Defence David Tonoyan announced a policy of "new war for new lands." Tonoyan's statement was accompanied by a series of military adventures on the line of contact. In July 2020, units of Armenia’s Armed Forces used artillery fire in an attempt to seize favourable positions on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border towards Tovuz, but were unsuccessful. On 23 July, the same forces announced the launch of joint air defence system exercises with Russia. Following them, Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces hosted forces from Turkey for a number of joint military exercises until early September. Meanwhile, in August, an Armenian military sabotage-reconnaissance group attempted sabotage in the Goranboy area of the line of contact, but was forced to retreat with losses and the capture of the group's commander, Senior Lieutenant Gurgin Alberyan.

In addition to direct military provocation, and in violation of international law, thousands of Lebanese Armenians, including a large number of YPG and PKK terrorists, were resettled in the occupied territories, following the explosion in the port of Beirut and this, too, exacerbated the conflict. Tensions peaked in late August 2020 when Anna Hakobyan, wife of Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, publicized her participation in illegal military training in the occupied territories. However ineffective, these provocative actions and statements from Armenia have been assessed by researchers as a total negation of the negotiation process.

On 25 September 2020, Republic of Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, in online debate at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, noted the deaths of Azerbaijani servicemen and a 76-year-old civilian, as well as serious damage to civil infrastructure; the results of Armenian attacks. Further, the president declared that more than a thousand tons of military equipment had been transported to Armenia by military cargo planes since 17 July. On 27 September, Hikmet Hajiyev, presidential aide and head of the Foreign Policy Department in the Presidential Administration, issued a statement that at around 06:00 there had been a gross violation of the ceasefire by Armenia’s Armed Forces. On the same day, Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces launched a counter-offensive to prevent further provocations and martial law was declared in the country.

The course of the battles

In the battles that followed, Azerbaijan advanced rapidly and incurred very few losses. Initially liberating a number of villages and strategic bridges, its forces had liberated the whole of Karabakh’s southern border with Iran by 22 October and they then began moving towards the Lachin Corridor on 23 October. That corridor was the only relatively major highway connecting Armenia with the so-called Karabakh entity; control of it would prevent Armenia from replenishing fuel, ammunition and military reinforcements. Until then, Azerbaijan had put the Armenian army under daytime attack from conventional artillery, mortars and even direct fire and guided missiles to halt their military convoys. During the war, Jabrayil was liberated on 4 October, Fuzuli on 17 October, Zengilan on 20 October, Gubadli on 25 October and Shusha city on 8 November.

The Shusha operation, unprecedented in modern military history

Details of the patriotic war have not yet been fully clarified, but it is safe to say that the operation to liberate Shusha from occupation will be forever in the annals of history. The crown, the beating heart of Karabakh - Shusha is a natural fortification, so it was impossible to enter the city with tanks or other heavy weaponry. There were two options to take it. Firstly, to defeat the enemy’s forces in the city by air strikes and artillery fire. Azerbaijan’s military command did not choose that way, due to the inevitably extensive destruction of the city that would result. The alternative was hand-to-hand combat, and this was the strategy adopted. Our heroic soldiers and officers traversed thick forests and deep ravines with light weapons, climbed rocks and mountains and defeated the enemy in face-to-face battle. A foreign journalist in Khankendi during the Shusha operation described the deplorable situation of the Armenians as follows: the defenders of Shusha were scattered. Dozens of wounded were taken in military ambulances to Khankendi hospital, covered in blood. The rest of the fighters, exhausted and throwing off their military uniforms, went down the mountain. Ambulances came and went non-stop. Wounded soldiers were piled on top of each other inside. Their injuries were evidence of hand-to-hand combat. Another report, published by Le Monde at the time, said that the defeated soldiers of the Armenian army left Shusha wounded and fled to Khankendi. On 8 November, the victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev gave our people the good news of Shusha’s liberation. The winning of Shusha, in fact, decided the fate of the war. The next day came news that more than 70 villages had been liberated, and one day later Prime Minister Pashinyan was forced to sign an act of capitulation, accepting the terms of the President of Azerbaijan.

On 10 November, the President of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Russia signed a statement declaring a complete ceasefire and end to all military operations in the conflict zone. According to the terms of the statement, Aghdam was liberated on 20 November, Kelbajar on 25 November, and Lachin on 1 December without a single shot being fired or single casualty. The statement also announced the planned construction of new transport communications connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of the rest of Azerbaijan. Thus, Azerbaijan's military victory had forced Armenia to capitulate. The ceasefire was violated on 11 December - the first time since the end of military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and the start of peacekeeping operations by the Russian Federation. The violation of the ceasefire was registered in Hadrut, where one Azerbaijani soldier was wounded.

Azerbaijan's military superiority

The Azerbaijani army made extensive use of the Israeli-made Harop strike weaponry during the 44-day war, including the Israel-Azerbaijan, jointly-produced Strike drone, as well as other UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2 strike drones. Azerbaijan destroyed $1 billion worth of Armenian military equipment with the Bayraktar TB2 drones alone. They were used to deliver precise strikes on enemy equipment and manpower, as well as directing artillery fire and conducting reconnaissance. Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer noted that despite an approximate balance in the respective militaries, the Azerbaijani army had a technological advantage.

Losses in the Second Karabakh War

According to information from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence, its armed forces incurred losses of 2907 service personnel in the war. This number may increase following DNA analysis of other bodies and enquiries into the fates of more than 100 personnel still missing. The wounded are being treated in medical facilities. Losses of military equipment were relatively minor.

Although the Armenian side confirms losses of 2,425 service personnel during the war, in reality the figure is much higher.

As a result of the 44-day war, Armenia lost 10 x S-300 missiles and their tactical-combat vehicles, 366 tanks, 352 cannon of various calibres, 22 unmanned aerial vehicles, 5 x Su-25 aircraft, 50 Tor, Osa, Kub and Krug anti-aircraft missile systems. At the same time, of particular significance was the destruction in combat operations of the following ballistic missiles: 97 Grad, 4 Smerch, 1 Tos thermobaric, 2 Hurricane, 1 Yars and 1 Tochka-U, as well as Elbrus missile complexes. The value of military equipment destroyed or captured by the Azerbaijani army is estimated at a minimum of $3.8 billion.

Foreign, mercenary and terrorist participants in the war

Prior to the conflict, Turkish sources reported that many members of the YPG and PKK from Iraq and Syria had been relocated to Nagorno-Karabakh to train Armenian armed fighters against Azerbaijan. On 30 September, they reported that about 300 PKK fighters had been moved to Nagorno-Karabakh via Iran. According to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on 28 September, there were mercenaries of Armenian origin from Syria and various countries in the Middle East among Armenian casualties. On 30 September, Hikmet Hajiyev said that, "the international community must respond adequately to the use of Armenian terrorist forces against Azerbaijan." A number of PKK and YPG members also admitted in recent interviews with various media outlets that members of those terrorist organizations were fighting on the Armenian side in Karabakh.

Further, it is known that citizens of Armenian descent living in Lebanon, Syria, France and some Latin American countries took part in hostilities at the urging of the Armenian Diaspora, and in violation of the principles of international law. On 1 October, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed that Syrian fighters of Armenian descent had been taken from Syria to Armenia.

The domestic situation in Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War; a unity of people and government

Political and economic stability prevailed in Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War; the highest level of unity was apparent between people and government.

On the morning of 27 September, the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies announced that a number of restrictions had been imposed on the internet within the country to counter provocations by Armenia. The State Committee for Work with the Diaspora also appealed to Azerbaijanis living abroad not to spread unofficial, unspecified or biased information on social networks or electronic and other media. At a meeting in the Milli Majlis (parliament) discussing the military situation, it was decided to declare a curfew in Baku, Ganja, Goygol, Yevlakh and a number of regions from 00:00 on 27 September. By that order, Vilayat Eyvazov, Minister of Internal Affairs, was appointed commandant of the territories in which curfew was applied during martial law. Azerbaijan Airlines’ press service also announced that all airports in Azerbaijan would be closed to regular passenger flights until 30 September. President Ilham Aliyev issued an order for partial mobilization in Azerbaijan and instructed the State Service for Mobilization and Conscription to ensure conscription of military officials and the implementation of measures arising from military-transport requirements in accordance with approved plans. That order came into force on 28 September. The Azerbaijani Army’s success in preventing military advances by the Armenian Armed Forces and its victories over the enemy achieved along the front were met with great joy and enthusiasm by the Azerbaijani people. Azerbaijani citizens and those living abroad, as well as Turkish citizens, sent numerous letters of congratulation and gratitude to President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev for those achievements. Thousands of Turkish citizens awaiting a "command for war against the Armenians" also sent him letters, saying they were always ready to free the fraternal state from the occupiers. Also since 27 September, the country’s tricolour flag has flown on the streets of Baku, on the balconies of residential buildings, shop fronts and other facilities. People fly the flag from their homes in honour of the successes achieved at the front and the liberation of their lands. Cars are also adorned with smaller flags.

On 30 September, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, together with the Azerbaijani FA, organized a flag campaign "We are strong together." Volunteers distributed hundreds of flags in different parts of the capital, Baku.

The domestic situation in Armenia

On 27 September 2020, The Armenian government issued resolution 1585N: a mobilisation of people aged under 55. It also stated that men between the ages of 18 and 55 in Armenia could only leave the country with the written permission of the territorial military commissariats. On 29 September, the trial of former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan and other former officials accused of involvement in the post-election riots of 2008 was postponed due to the departure of former Armenian Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan to the front line. On 1 October, access to the TikTok program was banned in Armenia. On the same day, the Armenian National Security Service announced that a former high-ranking Armenian military official had been arrested on suspicion of spying for Azerbaijani intelligence and charged with treason. On 2 October, Armenia closed all roads to Nagorno-Karabakh; they were to be used only for military purposes. Due to the demoralization of the personnel of a number of frontline units of the Armenian Armed Forces, and a widespread refusal by many soldiers to fight, the Armenian Defence Ministry appealed to the women of the country. On 2 October, the Ministry established a women's battalion and began recruiting for it. Armenia’s hopes depended on its women.

Information warfare, cyber attacks

The information war waged by Armenia against Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War was also countered effectively, indeed Azerbaijan defeated Armenia in the information arena, too. False news spread by Armenia was refuted in timely fashion, and objective information delivered to the global community. Cyber attacks were satisfactorily nullified.

President Ilham Aliyev, employed his deep knowledge, iron logic and irrefutable arguments to single-handedly neutralize smear campaigns by pro-Armenian media and support the effort on the information front. Some Western correspondents had been specially assigned to divert attention, citing fake information to make unfounded accusations against the Azerbaijani side. Certain of these were raised repeatedly: Turkish participation in the conflict, the use of F-35s, the involvement of mercenaries from Syria and Libya, violations of the ceasefire etc. And each time, the head of state patiently demolished these accusations with irrefutable facts and evidence, then spoke about the history of Karabakh, the causes of the conflict, taking the opportunity to convey the real truth to the world. Let's take a question during an interview with the German ARD TV channel and the president's answer. Question: When we were there, in that area, a question arose. Why is Karabakh so important for Azerbaijan? Is it a question of resources, or does it have symbolic importance? Answer: Are Alsace and Lothringen important to you? Is Bavaria important to you? Or Rhine-Westphalia? This is our land, our territory, recognized internationally. It is not a question of resources. The main resources are here in Baku. It is a question of justice, a matter of national pride, and an issue of international law. This response, brief but concise, was deeply meaningful. It was so effective that I do not believe any other Western correspondent will ask our president a similar question.

Any review of the past 17 years shows that President Ilham Aliyev has worked constantly to keep the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh on the agenda. It has featured in all his speeches and statements, at sessions of international organizations, in all his meetings with world leaders and in interviews. He endeavoured to ensure that everyone knew which side was aggressor and which victim. Now the whole world is aware. This is one of the main factors that determined success in the war. As for the victory on the battlefield, it suffices to describe two completely different scenes at its end: on one side of the front, the victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army, Ilham Aliyev, stands proud; on the other side, Nikol Pashinyan, with an army scattered and humiliated. Our people raise portraits of their leader, Ilham Aliyev, while Nikol Pashinyan is ridiculed and the butt of jokes. "You were going to build a road in Jabrayil, Pashinyan. What happened? Where is that the road? You were building a parliament building in Shusha, what happened? It went to hell.” These words of our president are now proverbial for his people. When someone’s actions do not live up to his words, they jeer and ask: "What happened, Pashinyan?"

Azerbaijani hackers got into a number of Armenian websites and posted President Ilham Aliyev's words from the international arena, "Karabakh is Azerbaijan, exclamation mark", as well as "If an Armenian soldier does not want to die, he should get off Azerbaijani land." Pictures of Azerbaijan's National Hero Mubariz Ibrahimov were also posted on Armenian websites. A total of 90 Armenian websites were hacked in attacks that began at noon on 27 September. These sites include the country’s most popular news and video portals. And in attacks that began on the evening of 27 September, Azerbaijani hackers seized a large number of confidential documents from Armenian state structures. These documents contained much information about the State Security Service, the president of Armenia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And also to prevent possible Armenian provocations, the Electronic Security Service of the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies called on citizens not to access links on social media, and not to download files or links in e-mails or phone messages. On 29 September, the hacker group Anti-Armenia Team seized 10 GB of confidential documents from Armenia’s armed forces. Several hackers from the Karabakh Hacking Team hacked the Armenian government's electronic document management system. As a result, 50 TB of documents were obtained.

The strong will of Azerbaijan’s political leadership

On 27 September, President Ilham Aliyev chaired a meeting of the Security Council. The president said, "As you know, early this morning, the Armenian armed forces committed another military provocation against Azerbaijan. As a result, we have losses among both the civilian population and the military. I warned Armenia. After the Tovuz events, I warned them several times that they would regret it if they did not give up their dirty tricks. Our counter operation is proceeding successfully. At the same time, tens of thousands are volunteering for the army. This shows our people’s loyalty to their state."

During a telephone conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the president noted that the statement by Armenia’s prime minister, "Karabakh is Armenia, full stop", had rendered the negotiation process meaningless and the Armenian leadership's demand that Azerbaijan talk with the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic should be regarded as an attempt to change the format of negotiations. The Azerbaijani army was fighting on its own land, and the Armenian army should not be on Azerbaijani soil.

On 29 September, President Ilham Aliyev was interviewed on the Russian Channel One programme, ‘60 Minutes’. He spoke out about the criticism of Turkey: "I believe that Turkey has a stabilizing influence in the region. Turkey is a fraternal country and our ally, giving us moral support, and we thank the Turkish leadership, the president and the Turkish people for their solidarity and support. All the rumours spread by the Armenian side about Turkey's participation in the conflict are provocations. The Azerbaijani army is well prepared to defend its people and territory,” he said. Asked about the Syrian National Army fighting in Karabakh, he said: "This is also fake news. There is not one fact, no evidence, and it was put out by Armenian propaganda." - he said and the interview was over.

On 30 September, Ilham Aliyev and Mehriban Aliyeva met with servicemen wounded during the Armenian attack that began on 27 September and who were undergoing treatment at the Defence Ministry’s Central Military Clinical Hospital. The president said: “The prime minister of Armenia set conditions for us. I said a while ago that we reject those conditions. We have one condition: that they leave our lands unconditionally, completely and immediately. I said that the Azerbaijani people will never be reconciled with this occupation".

Addressing the nation on 4 October, the president spoke about illegal settlement in Karabakh: "What does it mean to relocate the parliament of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to Shusha? Again, it is an attempt to insult the Azerbaijani people. What does it mean to build a new road from Armenia to Jabrayil? It means that there will be illegal settlement. Armenians are already being brought from Lebanon and other places, and resettled in our ancient city, Shusha, as shown on television, violating international conventions, trampling on the Geneva Convention. Does anyone have anything to say to them? I instructed all our foreign diplomatic missions. Raise this issue, tell the UN, the OSCE, the European Union, other organizations, that this is illegal! Illegal settlement is a crime! Has there been any reaction? Has the Minsk Group made a statement? It has not! Has the European Union spoken? It has not! They said that they had no interest in it. If it was of no interest then, then stay out of it now. What are you fussing about now? Nagorno-Karabakh is ours, our land, we must return there, we are returning, and will return!" he added.

On 8 November, the victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev addressed the people of Azerbaijan from the Avenue of Martyrs following the liberation of Shusha, saying, “We achieved this historic victory on the battlefield. 8 November 2020 will remain forever in the history of Azerbaijan. This history will live forever. This is our glorious victory, our day of triumph! We achieved this victory on the battlefield, not at a negotiating table. I have said many times that, despite all statements to the contrary, there are military solutions to this conflict - the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and today we are proving it on the battlefield. After 28 years, the call to prayer will be heard again in Shusha. Without this unity, without national solidarity, we would never have been able to liberate our lands from the occupiers. We have proved to the whole world that Karabakh has always been Azerbaijani land. We have proven that the Azerbaijani people have lived on these lands for centuries. We have proved that the Armenian population was relocated to these lands 200 years ago, how they were relocated and to what purpose, we have presented everything to the global community, with evidence and facts. We have proved that Nagorno-Karabakh is a historical, ancient land of Azerbaijan. At the same time, today I have visited the grave of the great leader Heydar Aliyev and bowed to his spirit. In my heart I said that am a happy man to have fulfilled my father's will. We have liberated Shusha! This is a great victory! The souls of our martyrs and the Great Leader are happy today! Congratulations, Azerbaijan! Congratulations Azerbaijanis of the world! Giving this great news to the people of Azerbaijan on this historic day is perhaps one of the happiest days of my life.”

The Armenian leadership’s desperation

On 27 September, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accused the Azerbaijani government of extended provocation. He said, "the recent aggressive statements of the Azerbaijani leadership, large-scale joint military exercises with Turkey, as well as the rejection of OSCE monitoring proposals" were an indication that it was preparing for war from the outset. On 28 September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia issued an official statement about the war.

Armenia’s ambassador to Russia, Vardan Togyanyan, also said that Armenia would apply to Russia for new supplies of arms. On 30 September, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he wanted Armenia to officially recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent territory. On the same day, the Armenian Foreign Ministry said that the Turkish Air Force was conducting provocative flights along the frontline in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On 1 October, Arayik Harutyunyan said that Armenians should prepare for a protracted war. On the same day, claiming that Israel sold arms to Azerbaijan, Armenia recalled its ambassador to Israel. On 3 October, the Foreign Ministry called on the international community to recognize the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in order to "restore peace and security in the region."

On 8 October, the director of the National Security Service of Armenia was dismissed by order of the President of Armenia. Also on 8 October, the Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs revoked the accreditation of the Novaya Gazeta magazine, saying that its correspondent, Ilya Azar, had entered Nagorno-Karabakh without accreditation and reported from Shusha and Lachin.

International Reactions to the Second Karabakh War

Turkey - "I call on the Armenian people to oppose their catastrophic government and those who play them as puppets, and take ownership of their future. I call on the whole world to stand by Azerbaijan in its struggle against occupation and oppression. Unfortunately, the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group, which have ignored this issue for almost 30 years, show no sign of action to resolve it. Armenia has once again shown itself to be the main threat to peace and stability in the region. Today, as always, the Turkish nation is by fraternal Azerbaijani with all its means", said Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a speech.

Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, and Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Numan Kurtulmuş, visited the Azerbaijani embassy in Ankara. There they met Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Turkey, Khazar Ibrahim. "The solution to this problem is very simple. Armenia must withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani lands", the minister said there.

Turkey’s Minister of Defence, Hulusi Akar, declared that his country was with Azerbaijan, stressing that Armenia's position was the biggest obstacle to peace and stability in the Caucasus.

The fraternal Republic of Turkey demonstrated unequivocally, in both word and deed, that it was with Azerbaijan in the Patriotic War.

The United Kingdom defended Azerbaijan's just position, as well as its territorial integrity, during the Second Karabakh War. A permanent member of the UN Security Council, the United Kingdom vetoed a draft statement on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict that was prepared on behalf of the chairman of the Security Council and was negative towards Azerbaijan; thus, it was not adopted.

US - US First Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Bigan contacted Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Jeyhun Bayramov and Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to urge both sides to immediately suspend military operations, use existing direct contacts to avoid further escalation and refrain from rhetoric and actions that could escalate tension in the region.

Richard Hoagland, former US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, said: "According to international law, Armenia has invaded and occupied the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan, another sovereign state." He noted that the main policy of the United States was to support and protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

Russia - Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stressed in speeches that "Armenia is an ally within the CSTO, but Nagorno-Karabakh does not belong to Armenia, so Russia has no obligation other than mediation concerning military operations in Karabakh." Russia’s Foreign Ministry called on the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for an immediate ceasefire. There were reports during the 44-day war of an increase in supplies of weapons and military equipment being transported from Russia to Armenia. According to those reports, weapons and military equipment were flown along a Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route as Georgia forbade the transport of military cargo across its territory. However, Russia has repeatedly stated that the officially transported cargo consisted of construction materials for its military base in Armenia, and not of weapons and military equipment.

Italy - Italy defended Azerbaijan’s just position during the Second Karabakh War, as well as its territorial integrity. The municipalities of Sepino and San Giuliano del Sannio in the Italian province of Campobasso and the municipal commune of Corbetta in the Metroplitan City of Milan adopted documents condemning Armenia's policy of aggression, ethnic cleansing and genocide against Azerbaijan, and expressing solidarity with the Azerbaijani people.

France - France called on Yerevan and Baku to suspend military operations immediately and resume talks. A French Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement that, "France is extremely concerned about the conflict."

France supported occupying Armenia in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. French President Emmanuel Macron's statement of 30 September on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was inconsistent with the country's mission as co-chair of the Minsk Group to mediate and resolve the conflict, and it called that mission into question. A draft resolution to recognise the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, adopted by the Senate of the French Republic on 25 November 2020, drew justified protest from Azerbaijan.

Georgia - President Salome Zurabishvili called for reconciliation and expressed her support for the maintenance of regional peace and security. Mikhail Saakashvili, third president of Georgia, gave his opinion on his Facebook page, "My position is based on the principle of territorial integrity, ie. Nagorno-Karabakh is the sovereign territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and nothing will change that." Georgia forbade the transport of military cargo to Armenia across its territory and airspace during the 44-day war.

Serbia - Information was received confirming arms sales by Serbia to Armenia before and during the 44-day war. Azerbaijan issued protests about this to Serbia.

Greece - gave indirect support to Armenia during the 44-day war.

Germany - German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that Armenia and Azerbaijan should immediately renounce the use of force in favour of detailed talks and called on both sides of the conflict to suspend all military operations immediately. He also expressed concern about the shelling of villages and settlements.

Iran - Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said that Iran was following the military clashes closely and that Tehran was ready to mediate a ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iranian officials denied reports of military shipments from Iran to Armenia during the war, and Iranian airspace and land routes were closed to prevent arms shipments to Armenia. There were also notable rallies in support of Azerbaijan's victories in various of Iran’s cities. The liberation of Shusha and Azerbaijan's taking control of its border with Iran were greeted with special joy in Tabriz, Ardebil and other cities. Internet footage of the Azerbaijani army attacking the occupiers, taken from the other side of the River Araz, on the Iranian border, was viewed widely.

Pakistan - Pakistani Foreign Ministry: "Armenia must suspend military operations to prevent any further escalation of the situation. We support Azerbaijan's position on Nagorno-Karabakh, which is in line with the resolutions passed unanimously by the UN Security Council." Fraternal Pakistan openly demonstrated its support for Azerbaijan during the 44-day war.

Kazakhstan - The Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all possible measures to stabilize the situation, renounce the use of force and begin negotiations, and offered to help resolve the conflict peacefully within the scope of international organizations.

Afghanistan - The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement about the tension in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. "The Nagorno-Karabakh region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Afghanistan demands an end to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh," the Ministry said.

Bosnia and Herzegovina - Shefik Jaferovich, Bosnian member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bakir Izetbegovic, leader of the Democratic Action Party, said they supported Azerbaijan, condemned Armenia and compared the situation to the Bosnian war of 1992-1995.

Israel - Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and former foreign and defence minister, reiterated in a statement to the local newspaper “Vesti” that Nagorno-Karabakh was Azerbaijani territory. "That is why no UN member state, including Armenia, has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a sovereign body. In terms of historical reality and international law, as well as the interests of the state of Israel, our position is absolutely unequivocal. We support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. We think that it is impossible to resolve the issue in the region without restoring that territorial integrity. In terms of history and international and national interests, Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is Israel’s official position," he said.

Hungary - A statement by Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade declared that Nagorno-Karabakh is located within the internationally-recognized borders of Azerbaijan.

The approaches of international organizations

European Union - The EU called on the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to cease hostilities, reduce tensions and adhere strictly to the ceasefire. Joseph Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also stressed the need to return to talks on a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict immediately, without preconditions and under the leadership of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. European institutions generally displayed double standards in dealing with the conflict, and have not really supported Azerbaijan's right to restore its territorial integrity, as enshrined in international law.

UN - UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, "both sides must immediately cease hostilities, reduce tensions and return to meaningful talks without delay." The organization said it would hold an urgent discussion on the situation in a closed-door meeting on 29 September.

OSCE - The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe called on both sides to suspend hostilities and return to talks.

Turkic Council - Baghdad Amreyev, Secretary General of the Turkic Council expressed deep concern over the military confrontation in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Turkic Council called for the protection of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and the inviolability of its internationally-recognized borders, and demanded the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

The Second Karabakh War and the Azerbaijani diaspora

On 6 October, rallies were held in support of the Azerbaijani state in the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Konya. On the same day, a rally in solidarity with Azerbaijan was held in Calgary, Canada.

On 8 October, leaders and members of the Eskisehir Azerbaijanis Association, the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (EHH) and other non-governmental organizations took part in an event at Eskisehirspor Stadium.

On 11 October, a large rally in support of the independent Azerbaijani state was held in Georgia's Marneuli region.

On 13 October, a rally was held in Milan, Italy to protest Armenia's aggressive policy, and in support of the independent Azerbaijani state.

The Azerbaijani diaspora in the Israeli city of Petah-Tikva held a rally protesting the occupying Armenian armed forces’ aggression and terrorism against Azerbaijan.

On 17 October, the Alliance of German Azerbaijanis organized a rally in Berlin with more than 10,000 Azerbaijanis protesting the death of civilians and minors, and the destruction of civilian facilities, following a further rocket attack by Armenian forces on Ganja.

On 18 October, on the occasion of Azerbaijan's Independence Day, the Azerbaijani flag was hoisted in front of the Chicago City Hall in Illinois to the sound of the Azerbaijani national anthem.

On the same day, a solidarity rally in support of Azerbaijan's struggle to restore its territorial integrity was held in Toronto, Canada.

On 21 October, on the initiative of the Azerbaijani community in Wroclaw, Poland, a permitted protest rally was held in front of the city’s municipal building.

On 26 October, protests took place in Miami, Minneapolis, San Francisco and Salt Lake City in the USA.

On the same day, the Union of Azerbaijanis of Sweden organized a silent march from T-Central (Ahlens), Stockholm, in protest against the terrorist attacks committed by Armenia in Ganja.

On 27 October, Azerbaijanis living in London held a protest rally near the office of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

On 29 October, Azerbaijanis living in Houston, Texas, held a rally in front of Houston City Hall to inform the global community about the terrorist acts committed by the Armenian army in the Azerbaijani cities of Barda and Ganja, as well as other settlements.

On 30 October, Azerbaijanis living and studying in Italy, as well as representatives of the Turkish community, held a rally in Venice to raise awareness of the Armenian army's terrorist attacks on Ganja and Barda, and the killing of civilians, including women and children.

The Second Karabakh War and the Armenian diaspora

The Armenian diaspora was not as active as expected during the Second Karabakh War. Representatives of the diaspora living in different countries were, however, remembered for their aggressive actions.

On 11 October, the Armenian community of Los Angeles staged a protest of 100,000 people in front of the Turkish consulate, along with smaller protests in Washington, San Francisco, New York, Boston and elsewhere in the United States.

On 28 October, Armenians blocked the road in Isere, south-west France. The road to Lyon and Marseille was blocked. A confrontation broke out between those stuck in the traffic and the protesters. Not content with this, 300-400 Armenian protesters attacked and injured Turks on their way to work.

The effect on sport

Because of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, UEFA’s Executive Committee banned matches under the UEFA flag in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Representatives from both countries decided not to play home games indefinitely. UEFA monitored the situation, and the decision does not affect planning for next summer’s Euro 2020 finals in Baku.

The defeat of Armenian fascism and a new reality in the region

In previous wars, there was a tactic known as "scorched earth", by which a defensive force destroyed or looted all it could, setting fire to what it could not. This also prevented the local population, the owners of the land, from settling there. In 1977, Article 54 of Protocol No.1 of the Geneva Convention banned "scorched earth" as a tactic; it is now a war crime. 21st century Armenians are, however, using this tactic, regarded as primitive by the civilized world. As our President said, it is as if a savage tribe has passed through these places. Videos of our liberated cities and villages are heart-breaking. The savage enemy has not laid a stone upon stone, but has reduced everything to ruin. Trees have been cut down, forests cut down and burned, and land has been rendered useless. Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zengilan and Gubadli resemble deserts. Aghdam is a city of ghosts, even an atomic bomb did not destroy Hiroshima as completely. Armenia's war crimes do not end there. Two ballistic missiles were fired at Ganja, and Barda was bombarded with cluster munitions. The number of shells fired at Terter, Aghdam and Goranboy are uncounted. Hundreds of civilians - children, women, the elderly - fell victim to Armenian fascism; thousands of houses, apartment buildings and infrastructure were destroyed.

It is important that the whole world sees their fascist image. Let everyone see and know what a savage enemy we face. Let everyone know that we have destroyed not only an occupying army, but also Armenian fascism, a source of danger to humanity. On instructions from the president, members of the diplomatic corps in Azerbaijan are visiting the liberated regions, where they witness Armenia’s atrocities with their own eyes. The terrible destruction will be recorded, piece by piece, documented and submitted to the international court. Armenian fascists will surely not escape justice this time.

The enemy believed that following such destruction, Azerbaijanis would never return to those places. They were mistaken, the people of Azerbaijan have lived with a desire for 30 years to reunite with their homeland, and have breathed for Karabakh. During a visit to the liberated cities of Fuzuli and Aghdam, President Ilham Aliyev announced his plans for Karabakh’s future. He stated that all towns and villages will be restored according to a master plan. The state will provide the necessary assistance for citizens to return to their homeland. The construction of a new road from Fuzuli to Shusha and the restoration of historical roads leading to Sugovushan and Talysh villages have already begun. The Second Karabakh War has created a new reality in the region. Our beautiful Karabakh, convulsed by storms over the ages, looks to the future with great hope. After 27 years, the call to prayer is heard again in the Shusha and Aghdam mosques, and Karabakh Shikestesi is heard once more in the lands of Karabakh. Life is returning to those places after 30 years, a new cycle of life in those lands begins...

The successful end of the Patriotic War has changed the balance of forces in the region and created a new reality. We are not alone now. Fraternal Turkey is now with us at the political table. A Turkish soldier will also monitor the ceasefire in Karabakh. Messages continue to come from the highest levels in Ankara: “we will continue to stand by Azerbaijan”. This political and moral support strengthens us and prevents Armenia’s supporters from interfering. Addresses by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey as brothers, the fact that our star and crescent flags fly together, are sources of pride for our friends and an eye-opener for ill-wishers. Today, there is no status quo lasting 30 years. The issue of status is off the agenda. Instead, the implementation of plans to restore the destroyed cities and villages of Karabakh is already in process.

If we look at the many conflicts and wars taking place in the world, the last word lies with the stronger side. The 44-day Patriotic War of the Azerbaijani people for Karabakh is the latest example of this. Over the past 17 years, we have gained strength and crushed the enemy with an iron fist. Thirty years of occupation and injustice were ended in 44 days.

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Address by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Victorious Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev to the nation - 08.11.2020

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President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has addressed the nation - 01.12.2020

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At Front Lines of a Brutal War: Death and Despair in Nagorno-Karabakh

Times journalists find civilians huddling in basements as a three-week-old conflict over the disputed Caucasus territory hints of a long and punishing fight.

By Anton Troianovski

Photographs by Sergey Ponomarev

STEPANAKERT, Nagorno-Karabakh — On the front line, the stench is overwhelming. The remains of fighters have been lying there for weeks.

In the trenches, there is fear. The Armenians are defenseless against the Azerbaijani drones that hover overhead and kill at will.

At the military graveyard, bulldozers have scraped away a hillside. It is already lined with two rows of new graves, along with soon-to-be-filled, freshly dug, rectangular holes.

The three-week-old conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over a disputed territory in the Caucasus Mountains, where Europe meets Asia, has settled into a brutal war of attrition, soldiers and civilians said in interviews here on the ground in recent days.

Azerbaijan is sacrificing columns of fighters, Armenians say, to eke out small territorial gains in the treacherous terrain of Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave that is part of Azerbaijan under international law.

Civilians who have stayed behind live in their damp and unheated basements, converted in recent weeks with makeshift kitchens, and where some sleep on flattened cardboard boxes. The shelling and missile barrages into the towns in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan have killed dozens of civilians and hundreds of soldiers and have filled the nights with terrifying flashes and booms.

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An Account on Karabakh War: Why Now and Then What?

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What Cultural Genocide Looks Like for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh

S eptember 2023 saw the tumultuous and traumatic departure of over 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh . This mass exodus of an indigenous people from their homeland followed nine months of starvation-by-blockade , which culminated in a murderous military assault on Sept. 19.

These men, women, and children, terrified for their lives, left behind entire worlds: their schools and shops; their fields, flocks, and vineyards; the cemeteries of their ancestors. They also left behind the churches, large and small, ancient and more modern, magnificent and modest, where they had for centuries gathered together and prayed. They also left behind bridges, fortifications, early modern mansions, and Soviet-era monuments, such as the beloved “We are Our Mountains” statues. What will happen now to those places? There is no question, actually.

We know well what happened in Julfa , in Nakhichevan : a spectacular landscape of 16th-century Armenian tombstones was erased from the face the earth by Azerbaijan over a period of years. We know what happened to the Church of the Mother of God in Jebrayil and the Armenian cemetery in the village of Mets Tagher (or Böyük Taglar) —both were completely scrubbed from the landscape using earthmoving equipment like bulldozers. And we know what happened to the Cathedral of Ghazanchetsots in Shushi, which was, in turn, shelled, vandalized with graffiti, “restored” without its Armenian cupola, and now rebranded as a “Christian” temple. The brazenness of these actions, as journalist Joshua Kucera wrote in May 2021 , “suggests a growing confidence that [Baku] can remake their newly retaken territories in whatever image they want.”

The annihilation of millennia of Armenian life in Arstakh was enabled by the inaction and seeming indifference of those who might have prevented it. The United States and the European Union speak loftily of universal human rights, but did nothing for nine months while the people of Arstakh were denied food, medicine, fuel, and other vital supplies. They did nothing to enforce the order of the International Court of Justice demanding back in February 2023 that Azerbaijan end its blockade. That inaction clearly emboldened Azerbaijan to attack—just as it will encourage others to do the same elsewhere.

More From TIME

Read More: The U.S. Keeps Failing Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh

It’s important to understand the stakes of this kind of cultural erasure: These monuments and stones testify to the generations of Armenians who worshipped in and cared about them. To destroy them, is to erase not only a culture, but a people. As art historian Barry Flood observed in 2016 about the destruction of cultural heritage by the so-called Islamic state since 2014, “the physical destruction of communal connective tissues—the archives, artifacts, and monuments in which complex micro-histories were instantiated—means that there are now things about these pasts that cannot and never will be known.” The Julfa cemetery is a tragic example of such loss.

If history is any indication, ethnic cleansing tends to be followed by all kinds of cultural destruction, from vandalism to complete effacement from the landscape. The latter tactic will be used with smaller, lesser-known churches. It will be a sinister way to remove less famous Armenian monuments, which will serve the narrative that there were no Armenians there in the early modern period to begin with.

Falsification will also occur, in which Armenian monuments are provided with newly created histories and contexts. The 13 th - century monasteries of Dadivank (in the Kalbajar district) and Gandzasar (in the Martakert province), both magnificent and characteristic examples of medieval Armenian architecture, have already been rebranded as “ancient Caucasian Albanian temples.” Expect these and other sites to become venues for conferences and workshops to highlight “ancient Caucasian Albanian culture.” As for the countless Armenian inscriptions on these buildings, khachkars, and tombstones: these, as President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev announced in February 2021, are Armenian forgeries , and will be “restored” to their “original appearance” (presumably through gouging, sandblasting, or removing of Armenian inscribed stones, as was done in the 1980s).

Finally, there will be a celebration of the “multiculturalism” of Azerbaijan. “Come to Karabakh, home of ancient Christians,” people will say. “Please ignore the gouged-out letters on that stone wall, for it is not an Armenian inscription. There were never Armenians here!" Except for soldiers and invaders, like the ones depicted in a reprehensible museum in Baku, featuring waxen figures of dead Armenian soldiers —a sight so dehumanizing that an international human rights organizations, including Azerbaijani activists, cried out for its closure.

This is how cultural genocide plays out. A little more than 100 years ago was the Armenian Genocide waged by the Ottoman Empire, followed by largescale looting, vandalization, and destruction of Armenian sites across what is now modern-day Turkey. The prospect of a second cultural genocide is now on the table. Except now, Armenians will watch the spectacle unfold online, enduring the trauma site by site and monument by monument.

In 2020, Armenian activists called for international monitoring of vulnerable sites in Nagorno-Karabakh by UNESCO and other heritage organizations. Nothing happened. Now is the time for the world to protect what Armenian culture remains in Nagorno-Karabakh. If we don’t, what culture will be next to go?

Want more fresh perspectives? Sign up for TIME POV , our opinion newsletter .

The original version of this story misstated the president of Azerbaijan's name. It is Ilham Aliyev, not Ilhan Aliyev.

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The 44-Day Karabakh War: Conclusions and Ramifications

This report aims to provide a critical discussion of and reach conclusions regarding the ramifications of the 44-Day War for the region and beyond. In doing so, the report will focus on the chronology of the war; its impact on Armenia–diaspora relations; the economic implications of the war for the broader region; as well as its implications for international relations.

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The deadly clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, explained

Joe Hernandez

Charles Maynes

Soldiers carry coffins during funerals at a military cemetery in Yerevan, Armenia's capital, on March 2, 2021, for fighters killed during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Soldiers carry coffins during funerals at a military cemetery in Yerevan, Armenia's capital, on March 2, 2021, for fighters killed during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Fighting has flared up again between Armenia and Azerbaijan, two former Soviet republics and traditional adversaries sandwiched between Russia, Georgia and the Middle East in a region known as the South Caucasus.

The two bordering countries are bitter rivals and have been clashing over territorial claims since the late 1980s, with periodic bouts of violence occasionally erupting into outright war.

Hostilities began anew between Armenia and Azerbaijan this month in the deadliest spate of violence since 2020, with at least 100 people killed, officials said. A cease-fire reached last Wednesday put a temporary stop to the bloodshed.

Here's what you need to know about the conflict and what's ahead:

Tracing the bad blood between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan were well underway when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.

Nagorno-Karabakh: U.S.-Brokered Cease-Fire Falters Soon After It Starts

Tensions have largely centered on an area called Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave located inside Azerbaijan. Even though Armenia claims the territory, the area is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.

A war in the mountainous region in the early 1990s, which killed an estimated 30,000 people and displaced 1 million, resulted in Armenia gaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding districts.

Fortunes flipped in 2020 when the two countries went to war again, this time with Azerbaijan — aided militarily by its ally Turkey — retaking large portions of Nagorno-Karabakh and nearby territories, according to the Crisis Group . A deal to end hostilities was later brokered by Russia , which sent a peacekeeping force to patrol the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh, though it is still governed by local pro-Armenian authorities.

A picture taken on Nov. 30, 2020, shows what is said to be destroyed Armenian military hardware in the countryside outside the towns of Hadrut and Khojavend. AFP via Getty Images hide caption

A picture taken on Nov. 30, 2020, shows what is said to be destroyed Armenian military hardware in the countryside outside the towns of Hadrut and Khojavend.

Both sides have blamed the other for the most recent round of fighting, which has occurred not only around Nagorno-Karabakh but also along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and even within Armenia, a notable escalation in the conflict.

According to the United Nations , Armenia reported 105 service members killed and six civilians wounded before the Wednesday cease-fire, while Azerbaijan said 71 of its service members died and two civilians were hurt.

The cease-fire continued to hold as of Saturday as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and several other U.S. lawmakers arrived in Armenia. Pelosi blamed Azerbaijan for "illegal attacks" on Armenia — prompting an angry rebuke from Azerbaijan, which called her remarks "Armenian propaganda" that could re-escalate the conflict.

Russia has held sway in the region, but its influence is waning

Though Russia is a military ally of Armenia under a regional security pact, it brokered the 2020 peace deal between both countries and has traditionally tried to play a peacekeeping role in this part of the Caucasus.

This time, however, Russia's role has been further tested by the conflict in Ukraine, where the Kremlin's military campaign has faced significant setbacks amid a counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces.

"The timing of this is interesting because Russia really cannot help Armenia at this very moment," Paul Stronski of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told NPR . "The timing, the fact that Russia is preoccupied, certainly led to what looks like an Azerbaijani offensive at this time."

Turkey and Armenia discuss opening borders to more trade and travel

The most recent fighting has also gone beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and is now occurring along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which increases the risk of a "direct state-to-state conflict," Stronski said.

Complicating the situation further, Russia is a major arms exporter to Azerbaijan — as is NATO member Turkey.

In turn, Azerbaijan is a major exporter of oil and gas to Europe , where many countries are struggling with supply disruptions due to the war in Ukraine and are trying to reduce their reliance on Russian energy.

World leaders are pushing for peace in the region

Last week U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and urged him to "cease hostilities" after reports of shelling inside Armenia.

Blinken also spoke with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. On Thursday, Blinken spoke with Pashinyan again and expressed his condolences for the fatalities his country sustained during the recent fighting.

Margarita Khanaghyan, 81, walks past Russian peacekeeping forces in the town of Lachin on Nov. 26, 2020. Karen Minasyan/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Margarita Khanaghyan, 81, walks past Russian peacekeeping forces in the town of Lachin on Nov. 26, 2020.

"The Secretary reiterated our commitment to helping Armenia and Azerbaijan resolve issues peacefully," State Department spokesperson Ned Price said in a statement. "He said that diplomacy was the only way forward and noted he would remain personally engaged."

Miroslav Jenča, the U.N. assistant secretary-general for Europe, Central Asia and Americas, said the U.N. was "deeply concerned" about the renewed hostilities and warned that the fighting has the potential to destabilize the entire region.

Meanwhile, Russia suggested it will maintain its role as mediator — despite entreaties from Armenia to join the conflict on its behalf.

At a recent Eurasian forum that included the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russian President Vladimir Putin called "the latest incident" unfortunate.

"Most importantly, under Russian influence, the conflict was localized," Putin said.

"We hope it will continue that way."

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Nagorno-Karabakh Bears the Scars of Azeri Control

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One year after Azerbaijan’s militarized takeover of the area, Nagorno-Karabakh remains scarred by violence and loss. As peace efforts stall, our reporter uncovers personal stories that reveal the deep wounds of this enduring conflict.

Lala (R) with her parents and nephew visiting her sister’s graveyard in Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan. (Courtesy of Omar Hamed Beato)

On September 12, 2022, Gayane, a forty-two-year-old mother of four, made a brief phone call to her eight-year-old son, Hayk (real name withheld), to check in and let him know she would be unreachable for a while. Just weeks earlier, she had been deployed with her army regiment to patrol the town of Sotk, the last Armenian town before the Azerbaijani border. Neither Gayane nor Hayk could have imagined that this would be the last time they would hear each other’s voice. Mere hours later, Azeri forces launched a series of artillery and drone attacks against military positions and civilian infrastructure over the border. These clashes claimed the lives of almost 300 service personnel in just two days of fighting.

As the news broke, Lala began calling hospitals near the front lines to see if her sister Gayane was among the casualties that were being treated. “There was a live map of the war, so when we checked we saw [that the area where Gayane was deployed had been taken over]. We understood she was [dead], so the next step was to find her,” Lala says from a coffee shop in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.

Lala spent the next couple of days looking for her missing sister in Azeri Telegram channels. She knew that, in this war, it had become common to be brutally mistreated , with videos of such acts posted online. “It is sad to say but that was the advantage we had to search for her,” she says. “Because she was a woman, we were sure they would post a video.”

Indeed, on September 15, 2020, Lala’s worst nightmares became a horrifying reality. She saw a video showing her sister’s lifeless body, stripped and mutilated, with her skin slashed and her face defiled. In a final act of cruelty, her mouth had been stuffed with her own finger. It is believed Gayane was killed by an Azeri air strike before her body was desecrated.

Jacobin has reviewed the video and photo of Gayane that were posted on Azerbaijani Telegram channels. Due to the extreme brutality of the images, we have chosen not to share them.

“I could’ve never imagined human beings could do that to another person,” Lala says. It took two months for Azerbaijan to return Gayane’s remains to Armenia, as part of one of the many exchanges of deceased soldiers between the two countries. “Maybe by sharing this story, they will stop hating us,” Lala reflects.

A Vicious Cycle

These skirmishes were part of a broader Azerbaijani offensive that began in 2020 to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh, a region with a 95 percent Armenian population situated within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. Both nations have long-standing historical claims to the territory, which were largely suppressed during Soviet rule. However, as the Soviet Union approached its collapse in the late 1980s and new borders loomed, the centuries-old dispute reignited into a full-scale war.

“In the 1990s, Armenia’s military was very strong and successfully overcame the Azerbaijani army,” says Marylia Hushcha, a researcher at the International Institute for Peace. Armenia’s victory resulted in the creation of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, a breakaway region closely aligned with the Armenian government, located in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas, that has been predominantly populated by Azerbaijanis. The war left over 30,000 dead on both sides and displaced more than 500,000 Azeris — about 8 percent of its population — who fled to mainland Azerbaijan.

A 1994 Human Rights Watch report documented widespread violations of the laws of war, most of them committed by Armenian and Karabakh-Armenian forces. These violations included the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilian areas, forced displacement, hostage-taking, looting, rape, and the burning of civilian homes. The report also pointed to instances of executing prisoners of war, highlighting the severe breaches of international humanitarian law during the conflict.

“The stories of displaced Azeris fed government propaganda,” continues Hushcha. “There are a lot of hate stories about what Armenians did to Azerbaijanis. They are not unfounded, but they were used by the government as a mantra for over thirty years.”

It took Azerbaijan nearly thirty years to rebuild its military strength, fueled by oil and gas wealth, and go back on the offensive. Hushcha believes this is driven by a desire for retribution: “What Armenia did to Azerbaijan thirty years ago, now Azeris are doing the same to Armenians.”

As these historical tensions resurfaced, the opening salvoes of the forty-four-day war broke out on the morning of September 27, 2020. Annahit Gevorgyan, a thirty-four-year-old mother of four, was at home in Martuni, Nagorno-Karabakh, with her children when the first air strikes hit. While she takes a break in her newly opened bakery on the outskirts of Yerevan, she recalls, “The airstrikes sounded very close — much closer than on other occasions.’’ Her husband Igor, forty-one, had just returned from work, and seeing drones overhead on his way home, quickly urged the family to take refuge in a bomb shelter beneath a bank in the city center.

While driving with other civilians, a nearby explosion rocked their vehicle.

My daughter, Victoria, wanted to look at the sky to see the drones, and all of a sudden, I felt something falling. We all lost consciousness for a few minutes, when I woke up there was a white cloud and I could not hear anything [because of the blast]. I saw they had dropped a bomb in the house next to us — we were all injured and I realized my daughter was not breathing.

Igor, who was transporting civilians to the shelter on a bus, arrived at the scene to find devastation. Together with the help of others, he carefully lifted the wounded — including Annahit and their three-year-old son, Artsuik — onto the bus. Eight-year-old Victoria and a neighbor were already dead. Igor rushed the injured to the hospital, where doctors worked to save his wife and son, who had both been critically wounded. There, doctors recommended amputating Artsuik’s arm and part of his leg due to shrapnel injuries.

Igor dismissed the doctor’s advice and took his wounded family to Yerevan, where his son remained hospitalized for a month, undergoing twelve surgeries to remove shrapnel. To this day, due to the numerous surgeries, his head is slightly deformed, and doctors have been unable to remove all the shrapnel, as further surgery is too risky.

Crisis in Karabakh

Despite a Russian-brokered cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it wasn’t long before Azerbaijan resumed its military offensive. Nearly two years after reclaiming many of the territories it had lost to Armenia in the 1990s, Azeri forces imposed a blockade on the Lachin corridor on December 12, 2022. This strip of land, the only connection between mainland Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was vital for the movement of goods and people. Its closure effectively severed all physical ties between the regions, leaving some 120,000 Karabakh Armenians to fend for themselves, cut off from essential supplies of food and medicine.

Janetta, a sixty-six-year-old grandmother from Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert (known as Khankendi in Azerbaijan) recalls the dire conditions: “We ran out of food and electricity, we didn’t have anything.” She says there were many times all the family had to go hungry. “We didn’t even have a piece of bread. We wanted the small kids to go to Armenia because we thought they could die but we didn’t have anywhere to go.”

According to Amnesty International , the blockade disproportionately affected the elderly and children. Due to lack of fuel, hospitals were forced to halt many procedures and schools were forced to close because they could not heat the buildings. Former International Criminal Court (ICC) chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo labeled the blockade a genocide, stating , “Starvation is the invisible genocide weapon,” citing the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide as acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, including “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.”

Azerbaijani officials dismissed these claims, arguing that the checkpoint was necessary for security reasons and criticizing Ocampo’s report as containing “serious factual, legal and substantive errors” without providing specific counterarguments.

The blockade ended abruptly on September 19, 2023, when Azerbaijan launched a new assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing nearly all 120,000 Karabakh Armenians living in the territory to flee to Armenia. Karine Aghatelyan, a sixty-three-year-old grandmother from Berkadzor was at home chatting with relatives the day the offensive began. One of her grandchildren came home early from school and reported that the Azeri military had begun shelling Nagorno-Karabakh.

“That moment the bombing started next to our village. My grandson shouted that he was afraid that Turks [i.e., Azeris] were coming,” Aghatelyan says from her family home in Yerevan. As her village rushed to a bomb shelter, Aghatelyan stayed home, waiting for her other grandchild to get back from school. Once they were in the car heading to the shelter, an artillery barrage struck nearby, sending shards and debris flying. Aghatelyan and her grandson, Yura, were among the most severely wounded. Most villagers had already reached the bomb shelter at the time of the attack.

Eventually, ambulances arrived to evacuate Aghatelyan and her family. Due to the severity of her injuries, she was airlifted by Russian peacekeepers to Yerevan, where she and Yura had to undergo several surgeries to remove shrapnel. “Azerbaijanis are aggressors, they are like beasts, we do not know why they targeted us . . . there were no Armenian soldiers in the village, only civilians,” she says.

Breaking the Cycle of Violence

A year after the latest military campaign ended, Armenia and Azerbaijan are profoundly divided. One side bears the unbearable weight of mass displacement and the trauma of genocide , while the other revels in a newfound sense of redemption and triumph .

In an effort to break the cycle of violence, the Armenian government has been negotiating a peace deal with Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev. To facilitate this, the Armenian government has made significant concessions: it withdrew its bid to host COP 29 in favor of Baku, has refrained from discussing military retaliation, and surrendered four Azeri villages it captured in the 1990s.

Hushcha notes that many Armenians are unhappy with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, feeling he is neglecting historical grievances in his attempts to compromise with Turkey and Azerbaijan. “All the people who have lost their homes and family members during the war have a hard time accepting those things,” says Hushcha. “Justice is not on top of the agenda in these peace negotiations.”

In 2021, the Armenian government filed a case against Azerbaijan at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s main court for resolving disputes between countries, accusing Azerbaijan of state-sponsored racial discrimination against Armenians. Separately, Center for Truth and Justice (CFTJ), a US-Armenian NGO documenting war crimes since 2020, filed a case at the ICC last April, urging the court’s prosecutor, Karim Khan, to charge Aliyev and other high-ranking officials with genocide.

However, significant obstacles complicate efforts to achieve accountability through these courts. The Armenian government may withdraw its case at the ICJ if it views this as necessary for a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s refusal to join the ICC limits the court’s jurisdiction. Since Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, the ICC could face challenges investigating alleged war crimes in the region. This uncertainty casts doubt on whether justice will be served for the victims of the conflict.

Gassia Apkarian, one of the founding members of CFTJ has concerns about the Armenian government dropping its bid for justice in international courts to reach a peace deal with Azerbaijan. “The mantra that we keep repeating is that we cannot have sustainable peace unless you pursue justice simultaneously,” Apkarian says. “The issue we have had since the Armenian genocide in 1915, and all subsequent atrocities, is that if you don’t hold people responsible, atrocities return with impunity. That’s why accountability is key to peace.”

Jacobin reached out to the ministries of foreign affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan for their perspectives on the peace process but received no responses by the time of publication.

“The guns are going to fall quiet and the skies are going to clear up of bombs and drones when there is an honest peace agreement and there’s intense work in healing both countries,” Apkarian says. “Organizations like ours must exist to talk the truth and defend the truth, on both sides.”